## 1NC

### Off

Reject the 1AC’s call for the ballot –

It is a moment of interest convergence between the Affirmative and the judge – This rhetorical alliance with alterity is a technology of political demand that repeats the strategic attitude of the system it seeks to overturn – The guilty solidarity of the 1AC masks the privilege that prevents the AFF project from directly changing the lives of the people they invoke to warrant a ballot.

Chow, 93 – Andrew W. Mellon Professor of the Humanities @ Brown

(Rey, *Writing Diaspora: Tactics of Intervention in Contemporary Cultural Studies*, p. 16-17)

While the struggle for hegemony remains necessary for many reasons-especially in cases where underprivileged groups seek equality of privilege-I remain skeptical of the validity of hegemony over time, especially if it is a hegemony formed through intellectual power. The question for me is not how intellectuals can obtain hegemony (a question that positions them in an oppositional light against dominant power and neglects their share of that power through literacy, through the culture of words), but **how they can resist**, as Michel Foucault said, “the forms of power that transform [them] into its object and instrument in the sphere of ‘knowledge,’ ‘truth,’ ‘consciousness, and ‘discourse.’ “ Putting it another way, how do intellectuals struggle against **a hegemony which already includes them** and which can no longer be divided into the state and civil society in Gramsci’s terms, nor be clearly demarcated into national and transnational spaces? Because “borders” have so clearly meandered Into so many intel lectual issues that the more stable and conventional relation between borders and the field no longer holds, intervention cannot simply be thought of in terms of the creation of new ‘fields.” Instead, it is necessary to think primarily in terms of borders—of borders, that Is, as parasites that never take over a field in Its en tirety but erode it slowly and tactically. The work of Michel de Certeau Is helpful for a formulation of this para-sitical intervention. De Certeau distinguishes between “strategy” and another practice—”tactic”—in the following terms. A strategy has the ability to “transform the uncertainties of history into readable spaces” (de Certeau, p. 36). The type of knowledge derived from strategy is one sustained and determined by the power to provide oneself with one’s own place” (de Certeau, p. 36). Strategy therefore belongs to “an economy of the proper place” (de Certeau, p. 55) and to those who are committed to the building, growth, and fortification of a “field. A text, for instance, would become in this economy “a cultural weapon, a private hunting pre serve.” or a means of social stratification” in the order of the Great Wall of China (de Certeau, p. 171). A tactic, by contrast, is a cal culated action determined by the absence of a proper locus” (de Certeau, p’ 37). Betting on time instead of space, a tactic concerns an operational logic whose models may go as far back as the age-old ruses of fishes and insects that disguise or transform themselves in order to survive, and which has in any case been concealed by the form of rationality currently dominant in Western culture” (de Certeau, p. xi). Why are “tactics useful at this moment? As discussions about multiculturalism,’ “interdisciplinary,” the third world intellectual,” and other companion issues develop in the American academy and society today, and as rhetorical claims to political change and difference are being put forth, **many** deep-rooted, **politically reactionary forces return** to haunt us. Essentialist notions of culture and history; conservative notions of territorial and linguistic propriety, and the otherness’ ensuing from them; unattested **claims** **of oppression and victimization** that **are used** merely **to guilt-trip and to control**; sexist and racist reaffirmations of sexual and racial diversities that are made merely in the name of righteousness—all these forces create new “solidarities whose ideological premises **remain unquestioned**. These new solidarities are often informed by a strategic attitude which repeats what they seek to overthrow. The weight of old ideologies being reinforced over and over again is immense, We need to remember as intellectuals that the battles we fight are **battles of words**. Those who argue the oppositional standpoint are not doing anything different from their enemies and are most certainly **not** directly **changing the** downtrodden **lives of those who seek** their **survival** in metropolitan and nonmetropolitan spaces alike. What academic intellectuals must confront is thus not their victimization by society at large (or their victimization-in-solidarlty-with-the oppressed), but the power, wealth, and privilege that Ironically accumulate **from their** “oppositional” **viewpoint**, and the widening gap between the professed contents of their words and the upward mobility they gain from such words. (When Foucault said intellectuals need to struggle against becoming the object and instrument of power, he spoke precisely to this kind of situation.) The predicament we face in the West, where Intellectual freedom shares a history with economic enterprise, Is that “If a professor wishes to denounce aspects of big business, . . . he will be wise to locate in a school whose trustees are big businessmen. “ Why should we believe in those who continue to speak a language of alterity-as-lack while their salaries and honoraria keep rising? How do we resist the turning-Into-propriety of oppositional discourses, when the Intention of such discourses has been that of displacing and disowning the proper? How do we prevent what begin as tactics—that which is ‘without any base where it could stockpile its winnings” (de Certeau. p. 37)—from turning into a solidly fenced-off field, in the military no less than in the academic sense?

It is a form of self-subalternization, where the judge is encouraged to found solidarity with the Affirmative Other by valorizing suffering portrayed in the 1AC – However, their rhetorical strategy amounts to nothing more than a sham renunciation authorized by the same structures of power that produce alterity in the first place, turning the case at a higher level of analysis.

Chow, 93 – Andrew W. Mellon Professor of the Humanities @ Brown

(Rey, *Writing Diaspora: Tactics of Intervention in Contemporary Cultural Studies*, p. 10-11)

The Orientalist has a special sibling whom I will, in order to highlight her significance as a kind of representational agency, call the Maoist. Arif Dirlik, who has written extensively on the history of political movements in twentieth-century China, sums up the interpretation of Mao Zedong commonly found in Western Marxist analyses in terms of a "Third Worldist fantasy"—"a fantasy of Mao as a Chinese reincarnation of Marx who fulfilled the Marxist premise that had been betrayed in the West."16 The Maoist was the phoenix which arose from the ashes of the great disillusionment with Western culture in the 1960s and which found hope in the Chinese Communist Revolution.17 In the 1970s, when it became possible for Westerners to visit China as guided and pampered guests of the Beijing establishment, Maoists came back with reports of Chinese society's absolute, positive difference from Western society and of the Cultural Revolution as "the most important and innovative example of Mao's concern with the pursuit of egalitarian, populist, and communitarian ideals in the course of economic modernization" (Harding, p. 939). At that time, even poverty in China was regarded as "spiritually ennobling, since it meant that [the] Chinese were not possessed by the wasteful and acquisitive consumerism of the United States" (Harding, p. 941). Although the excessive admiration of the 1970s has since been replaced by an oftentimes equally excessive denigration of China, the Maoist is very much alive among us, and her significance goes far beyond the China and East Asian fields. Typically, the Maoist is a cultural critic who lives in a capitalist society hut who is fed up with capitalism—a cultural critic, in other words, who wants a social order opposed to the one that is supporting her own undertaking. The Maoist is thus a supreme example of the way desire works: What she wants is always located in the other, resulting in an identification with and valorization of that which she is not/does not have. Since what is valorized is often the other's deprivation—"having" poverty or "having" nothing—the Maoist's strategy becomes in the main a rhetorical renunciation of the material power that enables her rhetoric.

The subaltern is subsequently reduced to a fungible object, a passive object for the consumption of the debate community – the affirmative absorbs the power of alterity only to toss its carcass back into the dust

Chow, 93 (Rey, Andrew W. Mellon, Professor of the Humanities at Brown University, Writing Diaspora: Contemporary Tactics of Intervention in Contemporary Cultural Studies, Indiana University Press, pg. 12-13.)

In the “cultural studies” of the American academy in the 1990s. The Maoist is reproducing with prowess. We see this in the way terms such as “oppression,” “victimization,” and “subalternity” are now being used. Contrary to the Orientalist disdain for the contemporary native cultures in the non-West, the Maoist turns the precisely disdained other into the object of his/her study and, in some cases identification. In a mixture of admiration and moralist, the Maoist sometimes turns all people from non-Western cultures into a generalized “subaltern” that is then used to flog an equally generalized “West.” Because the representation of “the other” as such ignores (1) the class and intellectual hierarchies within these other cultures, which are usually as elaborate as those in the West, and (2) the discursive power relations structuring the Maoist’s mode of inquiry and valorization, it produces a way of talking in which notions of lack, subalternity, victimization and so forth are drawn upon indiscriminately, often with the intention of spotlighting the speaker’s own sense of alterity and political righteousness. A comfortably wealthy white American intellectual I know claimed that he was a “third world intellectual” citing as one of his credentials his marriage to a Western European woman of part-Jewish heritage; a professor of English complained about being “victimized” by the structured time at an Ivy League Institution, meaning that she needed to be on time for classes; a graduate student of upper-class background from one of the world’s poorest countries told his American friends that he was of poor peasant stock in order to authenticate his identity as a radical “third worlder representative; male and female academics across the U.S. frequently say they were “raped” when they report experiences of professional frustration and conflict. Whether sincere or delusional, such cases of self-dramatization all take the route of self-sub-alternization, which has increasingly become the assured means to authority and power. What these intellectuals are doing is robbing the terms of oppression of their critical and oppositional import, and thus depriving the oppressed of even the vocabulary of protest and rightful demand. The oppressed, whose voices we seldom hear, are robbed twice - the first time of their economic chances, the second time of their language, which is no longer distinguishable from those who have had our consciousnesses “raised.”

### Off

Next off – the counter-method

The affirmative’s critical pedagogy is change in the service of human freedom, taking for granted human/animal opposition – belief that language elevates biological value normalizes violence

Bell and Russell, 2000 (Anne and Constance, Canadian journal of education, http://www.csse-scee.ca/CJE/Articles/FullText/CJE25-3/CJE25-3-bell.pdf)

Take, for example, Freire’s (1990) statements about the differences¶ between “Man” and animals. To set up his discussion of praxis and the¶ importance of “naming” the world, he outlines what he assumes to be¶ shared, commonsensical beliefs about humans and other animals. He¶ defines the boundaries of human membership according to a sharp, hierarchical dichotomy that establishes human superiority. Humans alone, he¶ reminds us, are aware and self-conscious beings who can act to fulfill the¶ objectives they set for themselves. Humans alone are able to **infuse the**¶ **world with their creative presence**, to overcome situations that limit them,¶ and thus to demonstrate a “decisive attitude towards the world” (p. 90). Freire (1990, pp. 87–91) represents other animals in terms of their **lack** of¶ such traits. They are doomed to passively accept the given, their lives¶ “totally determined” because their decisions belong not to themselves but¶ to their species. Thus whereas humans inhabit a “world” which they **create**¶ **and transform and from which they can separate themselves**, for animals¶ there is only habitat, a mere physical space to which they are “organically¶ bound.”¶ To accept Freire’s assumptions is to believe that humans are animals¶ only in a nominal sense. We are different not in degree but in kind, and¶ though we might recognize that other animals have distinct qualities, we¶ as humans are somehow **more unique.** We have the edge over other creatures because we are able to rise above **monotonous**, species-determined¶ biological existence. Change in the service of human freedom is seen to be¶ **our primary agenda.** Humans are thus cast as active agents whose very¶ essence is to **transform the world** – as if somehow acceptance, appreciation,¶ wonder, and reverence were beyond the pale.¶ This discursive frame of reference is characteristic of critical pedagogy.¶ The human/animal opposition upon which it rests is **taken for granted**, its¶ cultural and historical specificity **not acknowledged. And therein lies the**¶ **problem.** Like other social constructions, this one derives its persuasiveness¶ from its “seeming facticity and from the deep investments individuals and¶ communities have in setting themselves off from others” (Britzman et al.,¶ 1991, p. 91). This becomes the normal way of seeing the world, and like¶ other discourses of normalcy, it limits possibilities of taking up and confronting inequities (see Britzman, 1995). The primacy of the human enterprise is simply **not questioned.**¶ Precisely how an anthropocentric pedagogy might exacerbate the environmental crisis has not received much consideration in the literature¶ of critical pedagogy, especially in North America. Although there may be¶ passing reference to planetary destruction, there is seldom mention of the¶ relationship between education and the domination of nature, let alone any¶ sustained exploration of the links between the domination of nature and¶ other social injustices. Concerns about the nonhuman are **relegated** to¶ environmental education. And since environmental education, in turn,¶ remains peripheral to the core curriculum (A. Gough, 1997; Russell, Bell,¶ & Fawcett, 2000), anthropocentrism passes unchallenged. ROOTS OF A CRITIQUE¶ Bowers (1993a, 1993b) has identified a number of root metaphors or “analogs” in critical pedagogy that reinforce the problem of anthropocentric¶ thinking. These include the notion of change as inherently progressive, faith in the power of rational thought, and an understanding of individuals¶ as “potentially free, voluntaristic entities who will take responsibility for¶ creating themselves when freed from societal forms of oppression” (1993a,¶ pp. 25–26). Such assumptions, argues Bowers, are part of the Enlightenment legacy on which critical pedagogy, and indeed liberal education¶ generally, is based. In other words, they are culturally specific and stem¶ from a period in Western history when the modern industrial world view¶ was beginning to take shape.¶ To be fair, Bowers understates the extent to which these assumptions are¶ being questioned within critical pedagogy (e.g., Giroux, 1995; Peters, 1995;¶ Shapiro, 1994; Weiler & Mitchell, 1992, pp. 1, 5). Nevertheless, his main¶ point is well taken: proponents of critical pedagogy have yet to confront¶ the ecological consequences of an educational process that reinforces beliefs¶ and practices formed when unlimited economic expansion and social¶ progress seemed promised (Bowers, 1993b, p. 3). What happens when the¶ expansion of human possibilities is equated with the possibilities of consumption? How is educating for freedom predicated on the exploitation of¶ the nonhuman? Such queries push against taken-for-granted understandings of human, nature, **self**, and community, and thus bring into focus the¶ underlying tension between “freedom” as it is constituted within critical¶ pedagogy and the limits that emerge through consideration of humans’¶ interdependence with the more-than-human world.¶ This tension is symptomatic of anthropocentrism. Humans are assumed¶ to be **free agents** separate from and pitted against the rest of nature, our¶ fulfillment predicated on overcoming material constraints. This assumption¶ of human difference and superiority, central to Western thought since¶ Aristotle (Abram, 1996, p. 77), has long been used to justify the exploitation¶ of nature by and for humankind (Evernden, 1992, p. 96). **It has also been**¶ **used to justify the exploitation of human groups (e.g., women, Blacks,**¶ **queers, indigenous peoples) deemed to be closer to nature – that is,**¶ **animalistic, irrational, savage, or uncivilized** (Gaard, 1997; Haraway, 1989,¶ p. 30; Selby, 1995, pp. 17–20; Spiegel, 1988).¶ This “organic apartheid” (Evernden, 1992, p. 119) is bolstered by the¶ belief that language is an exclusively human property that elevates mere¶ biological existence to meaningful, social existence. Understood in this¶ way, language undermines our embodied sense of interdependence with¶ a more-than-human world. Rather than being a point of entry into the webs¶ of communication all around us, language becomes a medium through¶ which we set ourselves **apart and above.**¶This view of language is deeply embedded in the conceptual framework¶ of critical pedagogy, including poststructuralist approaches. So too is the¶ human/nature dichotomy upon which it rests. When writers assume that “it is language that enables us to think, speak and give meaning to the¶ world around us,” that “meaning and consciousness do not exist outside¶ language” (Weedon, 1987, p. 32) and that “subjectivity is constructed by¶ and in language” (Luke & Luke, 1995, p. 378), then their transformative¶ projects are encoded so as to exclude any consideration of the nonhuman.¶ Such assumptions effectively remove all subjects from nature. As Evernden¶ (1992) puts it, “if subjectivity, willing, valuation, and meaning are securely¶ lodged in the domain of humanity, the possibility of encountering anything¶ more than material objects in nature is **nil**” (p. 108).¶ What is forgotten? What is erased when the real is equated with a¶ proliferating culture of commodified signs (see Luke & Luke, 1995, on¶ Baudrillard)? To begin, we forget that we humans are surrounded by an¶ astonishing diversity of life forms. We no longer perceive or give expression to a world in which everything has intelligence, personality, and¶ voice. Polyphonous echoes are reduced to homophony, a term Kane (1994)¶ uses to denote “the reduced sound of human language when it is used¶ under the assumption that speech is something belonging only to human¶ beings” (p. 192). We forget too what Abram (1996) describes as the gestural,¶ somatic dimension of language, its sensory and physical resonance that we¶ share with all expressive bodies (p. 80).

Discourse of “civil rights” is not neutral – it relies on an explicitly anthropocentric human rights paradigm and is the foundation of the dichotomy between “human” and the “environment”

Burdon 12 (Peter Burdon – PhD in Earth Jurisprudence and lecturer at Alelaide Law School, August 10, 2010, “ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AND THE LIMITS OF RIGHTS TALK”, http://rightnow.org.au/topics/environment/environmental-protection-and-the-limits-of-rights-talk/) //MD

The rise of environmental human rights

During the 1970s the language of human rights began to make sense to broad communities of people as an “umbrella concept” for combating multiple forms of injustice. Most recently, there has been an attempt to extend human rights for environmental protection. There are two main arguments. First, that human beings have a right to a healthy environment i.e. a right to clean water. Second, that there are ecological limitations to human rights. While not yet implemented in “hard law” the latter argument refers to the idea that individual freedom is not only determined by a social context – but also by an ecological context.¶ Human rights discourse has assumed hegemonic status and is widely billed as “the only game in town” for environmental protection. Yet, many commentators have voiced serious concerns that a human rights model cannot address the root causes of environmental exploitation. To begin, the approach is overtly anthropocentric. Even the phrase “human rights and the environment” is species specific, focuses on “rights” which is an inherently individualistic concept and sets up an immediate dichotomy between the “human” and the “environment”.¶ Linguistics aside, **the very existence of environmental human rights reinforces the idea that the environment and natural resources exist only for human benefit and have no intrinsic worth.** In the example I cited above concerning groundwater pollution, my discussant’s rebuff could easily be viewed as consistent with the ethical framework of environmental human rights. Indeed, no human rights were being infringed, so what is the problem? Thus, while the language of environmental human rights has been seen as a politically useful tool for environmental groups to sway public opinion, it does not fundamentally challenge the mental ideas that partially explain environmental exploitation.¶ A second major critique of environmental human rights is that it seeks to adopt bourgeois legal concepts and treat them as both universal and foundational for the development of an alternative social form. In reality, this is no alternative at all since it merely re-inscribes dominant conceptions of value in a supposedly new framework. Foundational documents for environmental human rights discourse, such as the UN Universal Declaration of Human Right (1948), have also been used as central documents for market-based individualism. As such, it is doubtful whether they can provide the basis for a thoroughgoing critique of liberal or neoliberal capitalism. Indeed, whether it is politically useful to insist that the capitalist political order live up to its own foundational principles is one thing, but to imagine that this politics can lead to a radical displacement of capitalist growth economics is a serious error.

To discuss oppression as “dehumanizing” only reasserts dominate forms of hierarchy in hidden ways and furthers anthropocentric thought.

**Adams 94** (Carol, feminist scholar and animal rights theorist. M.Div. from Yale Divinity School, B.A. from Rochester University. Neither Beast nor Man, P. 77 http://books.google.com/books?id=CinU6Vy\_sYMC)

It is conventionally said that oppression dehumanizes, that it reduces humans to animal status. But oppression cannot dehumanize animals. Animals exist categorically as that which is not human; they are not acknowledged as having human qualities that can be denied. The presumption of an ontological absence of such human qualities has a priori defined animals as nonhuman. Resistance against oppression for humans involves recognizing and preserving their “humanity.” But, it is a humanity established through a form of negating: just as white Americans knew they were free by the presence of enslaved blacks, so oppressed humans affirm their humanity by proclaiming their distance from the animals whom they are compared to, treated like, but never truly are. A litany of protests erupt from those struggling against oppression, proclamations that assert “we are not beasts, we are humans, not animals!” Given the anthropocentric nature of Western culture’s primary conceptualizations, this response is not surprising. As I indicated in the preface, this has been an assertion upon which feminists early staked their appeal for our rights and freedom. Racist and sexist attitudes expose an elastic, mobile species definition that always advantages elite white males by positioning others as almost beasts. Will antiracist and anti-sexist theory so conclusively accept the inescapable anthropocentricity of the human/animal divide that the result will be a fixed species definition that clearly demarcates once and for all, all humans as human beings, thus tacitly but firmly positioning all other animals as “animals”? Consider the synonyms for beast offered by The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language (Third Edition): “brute, animal, brutish, brutal, beastly, beastial. These adjectives apply to what is more characteristic of lower animals than of human beings.” Will oppositional movements insure that these adjectives always apply only to animals, and thus inscribe as well the hierarchy that positions animals as lower?

**The 1AC’s failure to incorporate the non-human world ensures the replication of prevailing anthropocentric power relations**

**Bell and Russell 2k** (Anne C. by graduate students in the Faculty of Environmental Studies, York University and Constance L. a graduate student at the Ontario Institute for Studies in Education, University of Toronto, Beyond Human, Beyond Words: Anthropocentrism, Critical Pedagogy, and the Poststructuralist Turn, http://www.csse-scee.ca/CJE/Articles/FullText/CJE25-3/CJE25-3-bell.pdf)

For this reason, the various movements against oppression need to be aware of and supportive of each other. In critical pedagogy, however, the exploration of questions of race, gender, class, and sexuality has proceeded so far with little acknowledgement of the systemic links between human oppressions and the domination of nature. The more-than-human world and human relationships to it have been ignored, as if the suffering and exploitation of other beings and the global ecological crisis were somehow irrelevant. Despite the call for attention to voices historically absent from traditional canons and narratives (Sadovnik, 1995, p. 316), **nonhuman beings are shrouded in silence.** This silence characterizes even the work of writers who call for a rethinking of all culturally positioned essentialisms. Like other educators influenced by poststructuralism, we agree that there is a need to scrutinize the language we use, the meanings we deploy, and the epistemological frameworks of past eras (Luke & Luke, 1995, p. 378). To treat social categories as stable and unchanging is to reproduce the prevailing relations of power (Britzman et al., 1991, p. 89). What would it mean, then, for critical pedagogy to extend this investigation and critique to include taken-for-granted understandings of “human,” “animal,” and “nature”? This question is difficult to raise precisely because these understandings are taken for granted. **The anthropocentric bias in critical pedagogy manifests itself in silence** and in the asides of texts. Since it is not a topic of discussion, it can be difficult to situate a critique of it. Following feminist analyses, we find that examples of anthropocentrism, like examples of gender symbolization, occur “in those places where speakers reveal the assumptions they think they do not need to defend, beliefs they expect to share with their audiences” (Harding, 1986, p. 112). Take, for example, Freire’s (1990) statements about the differences between “Man” and animals. To set up his discussion of praxis and the importance of “naming” the world, he outlines what he assumes to be shared, commonsensical beliefs about humans and other animals. He defines the boundaries of human membership according to a sharp, hierarchical dichotomy that establishes human superiority. Humans alone, he reminds us, are aware and self-conscious beings who can act to fulfill the objectives they set for themselves. Humans alone are able to infuse the world with their creative presence, to overcome situations that limit them, and thus to demonstrate a “decisive attitude towards the world” (p. 90). Freire (1990, pp. 87–91) represents other animals in terms of their lack of such traits. They are doomed to passively accept the given, their lives “totally determined” because their decisions belong not to themselves but to their species. Thus whereas humans inhabit a “world” which they create and transform and from which they can separate themselves, for animals there is only habitat, a mere physical space to which they are “organically bound.” To accept Freire’s assumptions is to believe that humans are animals only in a nominal sense. We are different not in degree but in kind, and though we might recognize that other animals have distinct qualities, we as humans are somehow moreunique. We have the edge over other creatures because we are able to rise above monotonous, species-determined biological existence. Change in the service of human freedom is seen to be our primary agenda. Humans are thus cast as active agents whose very essence is to transform the world – as if somehow acceptance, appreciation, wonder, and reverence were beyond the pale. This discursive frame of reference is characteristic of critical pedagogy. The human/animal opposition upon which it rests is taken for granted, its cultural and historical specificity not acknowledged. And therein lies the problem. Like other social constructions, this one derives its persuasiveness from its “seeming facticity and from the deep investments individuals and communities have in setting themselves off from others” (Britzman et al., 1991, p. 91). This becomes the normal way of seeing the world, and like other discourses of normalcy, it limits possibilities of taking up and confronting inequities (see Britzman, 1995). **The primacy of the human enterprise is simply not questioned.** Precisely how an anthropocentric pedagogy might exacerbate the environmental crisis has not received much consideration in the literature of critical pedagogy, especially in North America. Although there may be passing reference to planetary destruction, there is seldom mention of the relationship between education and the domination of nature, let alone any sustained exploration of the links between the domination of nature and other social injustices. Concerns about the nonhuman are relegated to environmental education. And since environmental education, in turn, remains peripheral to the core curriculum (A. Gough, 1997; Russell, Bell, & Fawcett, 2000), anthropocentrism passes unchallenged. 1

**Anthropocentrism guarantees violence—humanism is the *original* hierarchy—we need politics that can respect more than human life. Their politics dooms us to a future that endlessly repeats the oppression of the status quo.**

**Best 2007** (Steven – Chair of Philosophy @ University of Texas – El Paso, Review of Charles Patterson’s “The Eternal Treblinka: Our Treatment of Animals and the Holocaust”, Journal for Critical Animal Studies, <http://www.drstevebest.org/EternalTriblenka.pdf>) //MD

While a welcome advance over the anthropocentric conceit that only humans shape human actions, the environmental determinism approach typically fails to emphasize the crucial role that animals play in human history, as well as how the human exploitation of animals is a key cause of hierarchy, social conflict, and environmental breakdown. A core thesis of what I call “animal standpoint theory” is that animals have been key driving and shaping forces of human thought, psychology, moral and social life, and history overall. More specifically, animal standpoint theory argues that **the oppression of human over human has deep roots in the oppression of human over animal.** ¶ In this context, Charles Patterson’s recent book, The Eternal Treblinka: Our Treatment of Animals and the Holocaust, articulates the animal standpoint in a powerful form with revolutionary implications. The main argument of Eternal Treblinka is that **the human domination of animals, such as it emerged some ten thousand years ago with the rise of agricultural society, was the first hierarchical domination and laid the groundwork for patriarchy, slavery, warfare, genocide, and other systems of violence and power.** A key implication of Patterson’s theory is that human liberation is implausible if disconnected from animal liberation, and thus humanism -- a speciesist philosophy that constructs a hierarchal relationship privileging superior humans over inferior animals and reduces animals to resources for human use -- collapses under the weight of its logical contradictions. ¶ Patterson lays out his complex holistic argument in three parts. In Part I, he demonstrates that animal exploitation and speciesism have direct and profound connections to slavery, colonialism, racism, and anti-Semitism. In Part II, he shows how these connections exist not only in the realm of ideology – as conceptual systems of justifying and underpinning domination and hierarchy – but also in systems of technology, such that the tools and techniques humans devised for the rationalized mass confinement and slaughter of animals were mobilized against human groups for the same ends. Finally, in the fascinating interviews and narratives of Part III, Patterson describes how personal experience with German Nazism prompted Jewish to take antithetical paths: whereas most retreated to an insular identity and dogmatic emphasis on the singularity of Nazi evil and its tragic experience, others recognized the profound similarities between how Nazis treated their human captives and how humanity as a whole treats other animals, an epiphany that led them to adopt vegetarianism, to become advocates for the animals, and develop a far broader and more inclusive ethic informed by universal compassion for all suffering and oppressed beings.¶ The Origins of Hierarchy¶ "As long as men massacre animals, they will kill each other" –Pythagoras¶ It is little understood that **the first form of oppression, domination, and hierarchy involves human domination over animals.** Patterson’s thesis stands in bold contrast to the Marxist theory that the domination over nature is fundamental to the domination over other humans. It differs as well from the social ecology position of Murray Bookchin that domination over humans brings about alienation from the natural world, provokes hierarchical mindsets and institutions, and is the root of the long-standing western goal to “dominate” nature. In the case of Marxists, anarchists, and so many others, theorists typically don’t even mention human domination of animals, let alone assign it causal primacy or significance. In Patterson’s model, however, the human subjugation of animals is the first form of hierarchy and it paves the way for **all other systems of domination** such as include patriarchy, racism, colonialism, anti-Semitism, and the Holocaust. As he puts it, “the exploitation of animals was the model and inspiration for the atrocities people committed against each other, slavery and the Holocaust being but two of the more dramatic examples.” ¶ Hierarchy emerged with the rise of agricultural society some ten thousand years ago. In the shift from nomadic hunting and gathering bands to settled agricultural practices, humans began to establish their dominance over animals through “domestication.” In animal domestication (often a euphemism disguising coercion and cruelty), humans began to exploit animals for purposes such as obtaining food, milk, clothing, plowing, and transportation. As they gained increasing control over the lives and labor power of animals, humans bred them for desired traits and controlled them in various ways, such as castrating males to make them more docile. To conquer, enslave, and claim animals as their own property, humans developed numerous technologies, such as pens, cages, collars, ropes, chains, and branding irons. The domination of animals paved the way for the domination of humans. The sexual subjugation of women, Patterson suggests, was modeled after the domestication of animals, such that men began to control women’s reproductive capacity, to enforce repressive sexual norms, and to rape them as they forced breeding in their animals. Not coincidentally, Patterson argues, slavery emerged in the same region of the Middle East that spawned agriculture, and, in fact, developed as an extension of animal domestication practices. In areas like Sumer, slaves were managed like livestock, and males were castrated and forced to work along with females. ¶ In the fifteenth century, **when Europeans began the colonization of Africa and Spain introduced the first international slave markets, the metaphors, models, and technologies used to exploit animal slaves were applied with equal cruelty and force to human slaves.** Stealing Africans from their native environment and homeland, breaking up families who scream in anguish, wrapping chains around slaves’ bodies, shipping them in cramped quarters across continents for weeks or months with no regard for their needs or suffering, branding their skin with a hot iron to mark them as property, auctioning them as servants, breeding them for service and labor, exploiting them for profit, beating them in rages of hatred and anger, and killing them in vast numbers – all these horrors and countless others inflicted on black slaves were developed and perfected centuries earlier through animal exploitation. ¶ As the domestication of animals developed in agricultural society, humans lost the intimate connections they once had with animals. By the time of Aristotle, certainly, and with the bigoted assistance of medieval theologians such as St. Augustine and Thomas Aquinas, western humanity had developed an explicitly hierarchical worldview – that came to be known as the “Great Chain of Being” – used to position humans as the end to which all other beings were mere means. ¶ Patterson underscores the crucial point that the domination of human over human and its exercise through slavery, warfare, and genocide typically begins with the denigration of victims. But the means and methods of dehumanization are derivative, for **speciesism provided the conceptual paradigm that encouraged, sustained, and justified western brutality toward other peoples.** “Throughout the history of our ascent to dominance as the master species,” Patterson writes, “our victimization of animals has served as the model and foundation for our victimization of each other. The study of human history reveals the pattern: first, humans exploit and slaughter animals; then, they treat other people like animals and do the same to them.” Whether the conquerors are European imperialists, American colonialists, or German Nazis, western aggressors engaged in wordplay before swordplay, vilifying their victims – Africans, Native Americans, Filipinos, Japanese, Vietnamese, Iraqis, and other unfortunates – with opprobrious terms such as “rats,” “pigs,” “swine,” “monkeys,” “beasts,” and “filthy animals.” ¶ Once perceived as brute beasts or sub-humans occupying a lower evolutionary rung than white westerners, subjugated peoples were treated accordingly; once characterized as animals, they could be hunted down like animals. The first exiles from the moral community, animals provided a convenient discard bin for oppressors to dispose the oppressed. The connections are clear: “For a civilization built on the exploitation and slaughter of animals, the `lower’ and more degraded the human victims are, the easier it is to kill them.” Thus, colonialism, as Patterson describes, was a “natural extension of human supremacy over the animal kingdom.” For just as humans had subdued animals with their superior intelligence and technologies, so many Europeans believed that the white race had proven its superiority by bringing the “lower races” under its command. ¶ There are important parallels between speciesism and sexism and racism in the elevation of white male rationality to the touchstone of moral worth. The arguments European colonialists used to legitimate exploiting Africans – that they were less than human and inferior to white Europeans in ability to reason – are the very same justifications humans use to trap, hunt, confine, and kill animals. Once western norms of rationality were defined as the essence of humanity and social normality, by first using non-human animals as the measure of alterity, it was a short step to begin viewing odd, different, exotic, and eccentric peoples and types as non- or sub-human. Thus, the same criterion created to exclude animals from humans was also used to ostracize blacks, women, and numerous other groups from “humanity.” The oppression of blacks, women, and animals alike was grounded in an argument that biological inferiority predestined them for servitude. In the major strain of western thought, alleged rational beings (i.e., elite, white, western males) pronounce that the Other (i.e., women, people of color, animals) is deficient in rationality in ways crucial to their nature and status, and therefore are deemed and treated as inferior, subhuman, or nonhuman. Whereas the racist mindset creates a hierarchy of superior/inferior on the basis of skin color, and the sexist mentality splits men and women into greater and lower classes of beings, the speciesist outlook demeans and objectifies animals by dichotomizing the biological continuum into the antipodes of humans and animals. As racism stems from a hateful white supremacism, and sexism is the product of a bigoted male supremacism, so speciesism stems from and informs a violent human supremacism -- namely, the arrogant belief that humans have a natural or God-given right to use animals for any purpose they devise or, more generously, within the moral boundaries of welfarism and stewardship, which however was Judaic moral baggage official Christianity left behind.¶

Illuminating the oppression of animals is necessary to fight that of those humans who are treated “like animals” by revealing the foundation behind both.

Adams 2010 ([Carol J: adjunct professor at perkins school of theology and a vegetarian feminist activist]), The Continuum International Publishing Group, "The Sexual Politics of Meat: A Feminist Vegetarian Critical Theory," pgs. 90-91, pdf) //be

When radical feminists talk as if cultural exchanges with animals¶ are literally true in relationship to women, they invoke and borrow¶ what is actually done to animals. It could be argued that the use of¶ these metaphors is as exploitative as the posing of Ursula Hamdress:¶ an anonymous pig somewhere was dressed, posed, and photographed.¶ Was she sedated to keep that pose or was she, perhaps, dead? Radical¶ feminist theory participates linguistically in exploiting and denying¶ the absent referent by not including in their vision Ursula Hamdress’s¶ fate. They butcher the animal/woman cultural exchanges represented¶ in the operation of the absent referent and then address themselves¶ solely to women, thus capitulating to the absent referent, part of the¶ same construct they wish to change.73¶ What is absent from much feminist theory that relies on metaphors¶ of animals’ oppression for illuminating women’s experience is¶ the reality behind the metaphor. Feminist theorists’ use of language¶ should describe and challenge oppression by recognizing the extent to¶ which these oppressions are culturally analogous and interdependent.¶ So, too, should animal advocates be wary of language that uses¶ rape metaphorically to describe what happens to animals, without¶ basing their analysis on a recognition of the social context of rape for¶ women in our culture. Metaphoric borrowing that depends on violation¶ yet fails to protest the originating violence does not acknowledge¶ interlocking oppressions. Our goal is to resist the violence that separates¶ matter from spirit, to eliminate the structure that creates absent¶ referents.¶ It is tempting to think that all that has been discussed in this¶ chapter are words, ideas, “abstract nouns,” how images work: that there¶ is no flesh and no kitchen. But there is fragmented flesh and there are¶ kitchens in which it is found. Animals may be an absent referent point¶ in discourse but this need not continue. What if we heeded Marge¶ Piercy’s response to abstract nouns; let’s go into the kitchen and consider¶ not only “who they beat” but “who [we] eat”? In incorporating¶ the fate of animals we would encounter these issues: the relationship¶ between imperialism and meat eating in imposing a “white” diet of¶ meat eating on the dietary folkways of people of color; the ecological¶ implications of what I consider to be the fourth stage of meat eating—¶ the eating of institutionalized, factory-farmed animals (after stages¶ of (1) practically no meat eating, (2) eating meat of free animals, and¶ (3) eating meat of domesticated animals); the meaning of our dependence¶ on female animals for “feminized protein” such as milk and¶ eggs; issues of racism and classism that arise as we consider the role of¶ the industrialized countries in determining what “first class” protein¶ is—all of which are a part of the sexual politics of meat.¶ There is a model for us of living, breathing connections awaiting¶ incorporation in our theory; a logical next step in the progression of¶ feminist thought is politicizing the ambiguity and slippage inherent¶ in the metaphors of sexual violence, as well as their social, historical,¶ and animal origins. The next chapter begins this politicizing process¶ by analyzing the role of language in masking violence and defining¶ the conflict between a dominant worldview that accepts meat eating¶ and the muted minority viewpoint of vegetarianism.

We advocate a critical praxis centered on challenging anthropocentrism.

**Our alternative is to endorse the thought experiment of the voluntary global suicide of humanity – that solves**

**Kochi and Ordan 08** – (Dec. 2008, Tarik Kochi, PhD, Lecturer in Law & International Security, University of Sussex, Noam Ordan, linguist and translator, conducts research in Translation Studies at Bar Ilan University, research focus on human cultural history, “An argument for the global suicide of humanity,” Borderlands, <http://www.borderlands.net.au/vol7no3_2008/kochiordan_argument.pdf>)

For some, guided by the pressure of moral conscience or by a practice of harm minimisation, the appropriate response to historical and contemporary environmental destruction is that of action guided by abstention. For example, one way of reacting to mundane, everyday complicity is the attempt to abstain or opt-out of certain aspects of modern, industrial society: to not eat non-human animals, to invest ethically, to buy organic produce, to not use cars and buses, to live in an environmentally conscious commune. Ranging from small personal decisions to the establishment of parallel economies (think of organic and fair trade products as an attempt to set up a quasi-parallel economy), a typical modern form of action is that of a refusal to be complicit in human practices that are violent and destructive. Again, however, at a practical level, to what extent are such acts of nonparticipation rendered banal by their complicity in other actions? In a grand register of violence and harm the individual who abstains from eating non-human animals but still uses the bus or an airplane or electricity has only opted out of some harm causing practices and remains fully complicit with others. One response, however, which bypasses the problem of complicity and the banality of action is to take the non-participation solution to its most extreme level. In this instance, the only way to truly be non-complicit in the violence of the human heritage would be to opt-out altogether. Here, then, the modern discourse of reflection, responsibility and action runs to its logical conclusion – the global suicide of humanity – as a free-willed and ‘final solution’. While we are not interested in the discussion of the ‘method’ of the global suicide of humanity per se, one method that would be the least violent is that of humans choosing to no longer reproduce. [10] The case at point here is that the global suicide of humanity would be a moral act; it would take humanity out of the equation of life on this earth and remake the calculation for the benefit of everything nonhuman. While suicide in certain forms of religious thinking is normally condemned as something which is selfish and inflicts harm upon loved ones, the global suicide of humanity would be the highest act of altruism. That is, global suicide would involve the taking of responsibility for the destructive actions of the human species. By eradicating ourselves we end the long process of inflicting harm upon other species and offer a human-free world. If there is a form of divine intelligence then surely the human act of global suicide will be seen for what it is: a profound moral gesture aimed at redeeming humanity. Such an act is an offer of sacrifice to pay for past wrongs that would usher in a new future. Through the death of our species we will give the gift of life to others. It should be noted nonetheless that our proposal for the global suicide of humanity is based upon the notion that such a radical action needs to be voluntary and not forced. In this sense, and given the likelihood of such an action not being agreed upon, it operates as a thought experiment which may help humans to radically rethink what it means to participate in modern, moral life within the natural world. In other words, whether or not the act of global suicide takes place might well be irrelevant. What is more important is the form of critical reflection that an individual needs to go through before coming to the conclusion that the global suicide of humanity is an action that would be worthwhile. The point then of a thought experiment that considers the argument for the global suicide of humanity is the attempt to outline an anti-humanist, or non-human-centric ethics. Such an ethics attempts to take into account both sides of the human heritage: the capacity to carry out violence and inflict harm and the capacity to use moral reflection and creative social organisation to minimise violence and harm. Through the idea of global suicide such an ethics reintroduces a central question to the heart of moral reflection: To what extent is the value of the continuation of human life worth the total harm inflicted upon the life of all others? Regardless of whether an individual finds the idea of global suicide abhorrent or ridiculous, this question remains valid and relevant and will not go away, no matter how hard we try to forget, suppress or repress it.

## 2NC

### 2NC OV

**We control the root cause – the first form of hierarchy involves human domination over animals – ten thousand years ago, the rise of agricultural society laid the groundwork for oppression of humans with the shift from hunting and gathering bands to settled agricultural practices – animal domestication asserted human dominance over non-humans, creating the metaphors, models and technologies used in slavery; metaphors included the plane of humanity above the plane animality, expressed in terms oppressors used to vilify their victims such as “rats” or “dirty animals”; the model was the concept of rationality which posited humans as superior to all other beings, using non-humans as the first measure of alterity, this was expressed through animal exploitation and later seen when slaves were treated as livestock – odd, different, and exotic peoples and types became seen as non- or sub-human and were placed in the violent system first created for animals; technologies included cages used contain blacks on ships traveling through the Middle Passage and the modern cage of Guantanamo Bay– that’s Best**

Anthropocentrism outweighs – it necessitates an ongoing ecocide

Gottlieb 94 — Roger S. Gottlieb, Professor of Humanities at Worcester Polytechnic Institute, holds a Ph.D. in Philosophy from Brandeis University, 1994 (“Ethics and Trauma: Levinas, Feminism, and Deep Ecology,” *Crosscurrents: A Journal of Religion and Intellectual Life*, Summer, Available Online at http://www.crosscurrents.org/feministecology.htm, Accessed 07-26-2011)

Here I will at least begin in agreement with Levinas. As he rejects an ethics proceeding on the basis of self-interest, so I believe the anthropocentric perspectives of conservation or liberal environmentalism cannot take us far enough. Our relations with nonhuman nature are poisoned and not just because we have set up feedback loops that already lead to mass starvations, skyrocketing environmental disease rates, and devastation of natural resources. The problem with ecocide is not just that it hurts human beings. Our uncaring violence also violates the very ground of our being, our natural body, our home. Such violence is done not simply to the other – as if the rainforest, the river, the atmosphere, the species made extinct are totally different from ourselves. Rather, we have crucified ourselves-in-relation-to-the-other, fracturing a mode of being in which self and other can no more be conceived as fully in isolation from each other than can a mother and a nursing child. We are that child, and nonhuman nature is that mother. If this image seems too maudlin, let us remember that other lactating women can feed an infant, but we have only one earth mother. What moral stance will be shaped by our personal sense that we are poisoning ourselves, our environment, and so many kindred spirits of the air, water, and forests? To begin, we may see this tragic situation as setting the limits to Levinas's perspective. The other which is nonhuman nature is not simply known by a "trace," nor is it something of which all knowledge is necessarily instrumental. This other is inside us as well as outside us. We prove it with every breath we take, every bit of food we eat, every glass of water we drink. We do not have to find shadowy traces on or in the faces of trees or lakes, topsoil or air: we are made from them. Levinas denies this sense of connection with nature. Our "natural" side represents for him a threat of simple consumption or use of the other, a spontaneous response which must be obliterated by the power of ethics in general (and, for him in particular, Jewish religious law(23) ). A "natural" response lacks discipline; without the capacity to heed the call of the other, unable to sublate the self's egoism. Worship of nature would ultimately result in an "everything-is-permitted" mentality, a close relative of Nazism itself. For Levinas, to think of people as "natural" beings is to assimilate them to a totality, a category or species which makes no room for the kind of individuality required by ethics.(24) He refers to the "elemental" or the "there is" as unmanaged, unaltered, "natural" conditions or forces that are essentially alien to the categories and conditions of moral life.(25) One can only lament that Levinas has read nature -- as to some extent (despite his intentions) he has read selfhood -- through the lens of masculine culture. It is precisely our sense of belonging to nature as system, as interaction, as interdependence, which can provide the basis for an ethics appropriate to the trauma of ecocide. As cultural feminism sought to expand our sense of personal identity to a sense of inter-identification with the human other, so this ecological ethics would expand our personal and species sense of identity into an inter-identification with the natural world. Such a realization can lead us to an ethics appropriate to our time, a dimension of which has come to be known as "deep ecology."(26) For this ethics, we do not begin from the uniqueness of our human selfhood, existing against a taken-for-granted background of earth and sky. Nor is our body somehow irrelevant to ethical relations, with knowledge of it reduced always to tactics of domination. Our knowledge does not assimilate the other to the same, but reveals and furthers the continuing dance of interdependence. And our ethical motivation is neither rationalist system nor individualistic self-interest, but a sense of connection to all of life. The deep ecology sense of self-realization goes beyond the modern Western sense of "self" as an isolated ego striving for hedonistic gratification. . . . . Self, in this sense, is experienced as integrated with the whole of nature.(27) Having gained distance and sophistication of perception [from the development of science and political freedoms] we can turn and recognize who we have been all along. . . . we are our world knowing itself. We can relinquish our separateness. We can come home again -- and participate in our world in a richer, more responsible and poignantly beautiful way.(28) Ecological ways of knowing nature are necessarily participatory. [This] knowledge is ecological and plural, reflecting both the diversity of natural ecosystems and the diversity in cultures that nature-based living gives rise to. The recovery of the feminine principle is based on inclusiveness. It is a recovery in nature, woman and man of creative forms of being and perceiving. In nature it implies seeing nature as a live organism. In woman it implies seeing women as productive and active. Finally, in men the recovery of the feminine principle implies a relocation of action and activity to create life-enhancing, not life-reducing and life-threatening societies.(29) In this context, the knowing ego is not set against a world it seeks to control, but one of which it is a part. To continue the feminist perspective, the mother knows or seeks to know the child's needs. Does it make sense to think of her answering the call of the child in abstraction from such knowledge? Is such knowledge necessarily domination? Or is it essential to a project of care, respect and love, precisely because the knower has an intimate, emotional connection with the known?(30) Our ecological vision locates us in such close relation with our natural home that knowledge of it is knowledge of ourselves. And this is not, contrary to Levinas's fear, reducing the other to the same, but a celebration of a larger, more inclusive, and still complex and articulated self.(31) The noble and terrible burden of Levinas's individuated responsibility for sheer existence gives way to a different dream, a different prayer: Being rock, being gas, being mist, being Mind, Being the mesons traveling among the galaxies with the speed of light, You have come here, my beloved one. . . . You have manifested yourself as trees, as grass, as butterflies, as single-celled beings, and as chrysanthemums; but the eyes with which you looked at me this morning tell me you have never died.(32) In this prayer, we are, quite simply, all in it together. And, although this new ecological Holocaust -- this creation of planet Auschwitz – is under way, it is not yet final. We have time to step back from the brink, to repair our world. But only if we see that world not as another across an irreducible gap of loneliness and unchosen obligation, but as a part of ourselves as we are part of it, to be redeemed not out of duty, but out of love; neither for ourselves nor for the other, but for us all.

You can’t access the ethics of eating

**Pugliese 13**—Research Director, MMCCS @ Macquarie U

(Joseph, *State Violence and the Execution of Law: Biopolitical Caesurae of Torture, Black Sites, Drones* pg 44-45, dml)

In the course of her painstaking documentation of the scenes of violent subjection that mark the life and death of black slaves, Hartman, at one juncture in her narrative, cites the testimony of the slave Charlie Moses: ‘The way us niggers was treated was awful. Master would beat, knock, kick, kill. He done ever’ thing he could ’cept eat us .’ 51 The human master can, in other words, ‘beat, knock, kick, kill’ the animal and the slave but they cannot eat the enslaved human. Charlie Moses’ testimony evidences how the homology between human slave and enslaved animal holds right up to this interdictory limit point. The critical caesura that is evidenced here opens up the space that will enable the ‘noncriminal putting to death’ of animals by humans in order to enable humans’ ‘carno- phallogocentrism.’ 52 Articulated in Moses’ testimony is the biopolitical freedom to torture and kill enslaved forms of human life with absolute impunity and the attendant prohibition on eating the human- animal-slave. It is only due to this singular prohibition that Moses can inhabit, in the most radically qualifi ed and fraught manner, the modality of the human. This intra- species prohibition functions to calibrate the human slave up one notch on the speciesist hierarchy of life. This interdiction, then, designates the only difference/division between human and animal available to the black slave. The difference between animal and human animal on the slave plantation hangs singularly on an intra- species prohibition that is animated by the most fragile of anthropocentric invocations: the only quarter granted to black slaves is to allow them a circumscribed space in which their fungibility encompasses everything but being served up as dinner on the master’s dinner table. This intra- species, anthropocentric prohibition operates as the term that cuts animals off from human animal- slaves, while articulating the entry of human slaves into a political life constituted by only one non- negotiable claim to the human: they could not be eaten.

### 2NC ROB

We’ll offer a counter-role of the ballot—write in the place of animals that die—the role of the ballot is to move towards a true political space which necessarily entails consideration of speciesism as prior

**Collard 13**—Geography Department at the University of British Columbia

(Rosemary-Claire, “Apocalypse Meow”, Capitalism Nature Socialism, 24:1, 35-41, dml)

‘‘A true political space,’’ writes Swyngedouw (2010b, 194), ‘‘is always a space of contestation for those who are not-all, who are uncounted and unnamed.’’ This true political space necessarily includes\*if only by virtue of their exclusion\*animals, the ‘‘constitutive outside’’ of humanity itself. How we respond to this dynamic ought to be a central question of critical scholarship and philosophizing. To be a philosopher, says Deleuze in the ‘‘A for Animal’’ entry to the ‘‘abecedary’’ (L’abe´ce´daire de Gilles Deleuze 1989), ‘‘is to write in the place of animals that die.’’ This is still an imperfect way of describing my objective (for one thing, I am also interested in animals that are still alive), but it is an improvement over being a ‘‘spokesperson’’ for animals, which are often characterized as speechless and may be rendered more so having spokespeople appointed to speak on their behalf. To write in the place of animals that die seems a preferable, though still fraught, characterization.

This paper is therefore written in the place of those uncounted and unnamed non-subjects of political space, the animals that die, the nonhumans, the hundreds of millions of animals that are ‘‘living out our nightmares’’ (Raffles 2010, 120): injected, tested, prodded, then discarded. We have denied, disavowed, and misunderstood animals. They are refused speech, reason, morality, emotion, clothing, shelter, mourning, culture, lying, lying about lying, gifting, laughing, crying\*the list has no limit. But ‘‘who was born first, before the names?’’ Derrida (2008, 18) asks. ‘‘Which one saw the other come to this place, so long ago? Who will have been the first occupant? Who the subject? Who has remained the despot, for so long now?’’ Some see identifying this denial as a side-event, inconsequential, even sort of silly. The belief in human superiority is firmly lodged and dear to people’s hearts and senses of themselves. It also seems a daunting task, not a simple matter of inserting the excluded into the dominant political order, which as Z ˇ izˇek (1999) writes, neglects how these very subversions and exclusions are the order’s condition of being.

### 2NC Human Rights

To explain violence as merely the suspension of the liberties or rights obscures the species war that is foundational to the law

**Kochi 9** (Tarik; Law, Culture, and the Humanities, “Species War: Law, Violence, and Animals”, 353-359)

In everyday speech, in the words of the media, politicians, protestors, soldiers and dissidents, **the language of war is linked to** and intimatelybound upwith **the language of law. That a war might be said to be legal or illegal, just or unjust, or that an act might be called “war” rather than terror or crime, displays aspects of reference,** connection, **and constitution in which the social meaning of the concepts we use to talk about** and understand **war and law are organised in particular ways. The manner in which specific terms** (i.e. war, terror, murder, slaughter, and genocide) **are defined and their meanings ordered has powerful and bloody consequences for those who feel the force and brunt of these words in the realm of human action.** In this paper I argue that **the juridical language of war contains a hidden foundation – species war.** That is, **at the foundation of the Law of war resides a species war carried out by humans against non-human animals.**

At first glance such a claim may sound like it has little to do with law and war**.** In contemporary public debates the **“laws of war” are typically** understood as **referring to the rules set out by** the conventions and **customs that define the legality of a state’s right to go to war under international law**. However**, such a perspective is only a** narrow and **limited view of what constitutes the Law of war and of the relationship between law and war more generally.** Here **the “Law” of the “Law of war” needs to be understood as involving something more than the limited sense of positive law. The Law of war denotes a broader category that includes differing historical senses of positive law as well as various ethical conceptions of justice, right and rights**. This distinction is clearer in German than it is in English whereby the term Recht denotes a broader ethical and juristic category than that of Gesetz which refers more closely to positive or black letter laws. **To focus upon the broader category of the Law of war is to put specific** (positive law) **formulations of the laws of war into a historical, conceptual context. The Law of war contains** at its heart **arguments about and mechanisms for determining what constitutes legitimate violence.** The question of **what constitutes legitimate violence lies at the centre of the relationship between war and law,** and**, the specific historical laws of war are merely different juridical ways of setting-out** (positing) **a** particular **answer to this question**. In this respect **the Law of war** (and thus its particular laws of war) **involves** a practice of **normative thinking and rule making concerned with determining answers to** such questions as: **what types of coercion, violence and killing may be included within the definition of “war,” who may legitimately use coercion, violence and killing, and for what reasons, under what circumstances and to what extent may particular actors use coercion, violence and killing understood as war? When we consider the relationship between war and law in this broader sense then it is not unreasonable to entertain the suggestion that at the foundation of the Law of war resides species war**.

[Continues]

Grotius and Hobbes are sometimes described as setting out a prudential approach,28 or a natural law of minimal content29 because in contrast to Aristotelian or Thomastic legal and political theory their attempt to derive the legitimacy of the state and sovereign order relies less upon a thick conception of the good life and is more focussed upon basic human needs such as survival. In the context of a response to religious civil war such an approach made sense in that often thick moral and religious conceptions of the good life (for example, those held by competing Christian Confessions) often drove conflict and violence. Yet, **it** would be a mistake to assume that the categories of “survival,” “preservation of life” and “bare life” are **neutral categories.** Rather **survival, preservation of life** and bare life as expressed by the Westphalian theoretical tradition **already contain distinctions of value – in particular, the specific distinction of value between human and non-human life**. “Bare life” in this sense is not “bare” but contains within it a distinction of value between the worth of human life placed above and beyond the worth of non-human animal life. In this respect bare life within this tradition contains within it a hidden conception of the good life. **The foundational moment of the modern juridical conception of the law of war already contains within it the operation of species war**. The Westphalian tradition puts itself forward as grounding the legitimacy of violence upon the preservation of life, however **its concern for life is already marked by a hierarchy of value in which non-human animal life is violently used as the “raw material” for preserving human life. Grounded upon, but concealing the human-animal distinction, the** Westphalian **conception of war makes a double move: it excludes the killing of animals from its definition of “war proper,” and, through rendering dominant the modern juridical definition of “war proper” the tradition is able to further institutionalize and normalize a particular conception of the good life.** Followingfrom this original distinction of life-value **realized through the juridical language of war were** other forms of human life **whose lives** were considered **to be of a** lesser **value** under a European, Christian, “secular”30 natural law conception of the good life. **Underneath this concern with the preservation of life in general stood veiled preferences over what particular forms of life (such as racial conceptions of human life) and ways of living were worthy of preservation, realization and elevation.** The business contracts of early capitalism,31 **the power of white males over women and children, and, especially in the colonial context, the sanctity of European life over non-European and Christian lives over non-Christian heathens and Muslims, were some of the dominant forms of life preferred for preservation within the early modern juridical ordering of war.**

## 1NR

No cards